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The category of the sphere of influence can explain some contemporary 
international processes. To define that category, however, much 
stress is laid on great powers’ exclusivity within their spheres of 
influence. The author takes into consideration the thesis of the afore-
mentioned exclusivity’s erosion. Because foreign military bases are 
essential instruments of spheres of influence due to their strong 
impact on security policy, it is worth investigating their presence in 
this context. Specifically, the author carries out an in-depth study of 
military bases of more than one major power in one host country. 
Further, the article discusses the extent to which the gradual erosion 
of exclusivity undermines the significance of spheres of influence 
as such. In conclusion, the author states that the case of Djibouti 
undermines the idea of great power exclusivity. Yet, other cases do 
not provide sufficient evidence on such deep transformation because 
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Introduction
For a long time, spheres of influence have caught the close 
attention of International Relations (IR) scholars. The issue 
focuses on geopolitical regions with special and dominant 
involvement of a given major power. However, after the Cold War, 
spheres of influence ceased to be relevant as the IR theoretical 
category. The notion survived in the ordinary discourse and is 
quite commonly used by political practitioners and journalists. 
This use seldom results from in-depth considerations of what 
criteria a phenomenon should fulfil to be called a “sphere of 
influence”. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that spheres 
of influence clearly link with security issues. On the global 
scale, political power has been usually exercised by armed 
forces or at least with some military support. Foreign military 
bases serve well for such purposes. For instance, occupations 
require permanent basing. Also, military interventions 
are feasible through bases in adjacent countries, and – if 
protracted – interventions need basing in a target-country. 
Basing became an important element of strategic presence 
abroad. Even declared projects of new bases or suspicions of 
adversary’s plans trigger discursive actions such as warnings 
or condemnations. In sum, foreign military bases clearly link 
with the problematic of the spheres of influence as essential 
instruments of exercising power.
The article researches the question of whether contemporary 
foreign military bases still serve as crucial components of 
spheres of influence which result from mutually recognised 
responsibilities, or if basing leads to major power rivalry which 
undermines spheres of influence or intends to shift their 
boundaries. The method of this article consists in studying 
countries hosting military bases of more than one major 
power on their territories as a possible indicator of the erosion 
of superordinate powers’ monopoly. Rivalry, cooperation 
or mutual ignorance become a second-rank variable which 
explains the context. Regardless of the conditions explored 
in this article, the erosion of major powers’ monopoly would 
undermine the whole idea of spheres of influence.
The article proceeds as follows: the first part is theoretical and 
aims to conceptualise spheres of influence and foreign military 
bases and their relations. Specifically, it provides the reader 
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category of international hierarchy. As a result, the history of 
spheres of influence can be analysed, and here an important 
aspect regards the role of military presence. The first part also 
considers how foreign military bases contribute to exploring 
the contemporary transformation of spheres of influence. The 
second part of the article analyses countries hosting major 
powers’ military bases on their territories. This analysis aims 
to detect circumstances in which two or three major powers 
installed military bases or facilities in similar locations. 
An important purpose of this part is to address the rivalry/
cooperation nexus regarding major powers’ involvement. 
In conclusions, the article summarises its contribution and 
considers some further research paths.
Understanding relations between spheres of influence and 
foreign military bases
The ongoing era, called simply the post-Cold War period, 
seems to be reach in various phenomena associated with the 
issue of spheres of influence including military interventions 
and occupations, establishment and maintenance of foreign 
military bases, trade agreements, expansion of investment 
and aid. The notion “spheres of influence” commonly appears 
in public discourse but is seldom theorised (Hast 2014: vii; 
Jackson 2020: 255). Moreover, political practitioners often use 
its too broad meanings. This results from a moral evaluation 
embodied in notions. In the case of spheres of influence, their 
notional use serves to accuse great powers of immoral practices. 
The notion is also useful for a simplified description of complex 
international affairs. The most striking in the contemporary 
era is how pejorative and normative the notion is. The meaning 
of spheres of influence undergoes changes not only by real 
political interactions but discursively: behind the spheres, 
there are judgements and power, interrelated. This encourages 
accusations of the stronger actors (Jackson 2020: 256-257), 
denials (Hast 2014: 4-6) or excuses, which are typical reactions 
to accusations. The pejorative use of spheres of influence does 
not exhaust their normative foundations: the spheres can 
contribute to the international order by stability, limiting great 
power conflicts and lesser powers’ conflicts within a given area. 
The spheres can also raise constant expectations between great 
powers and between subordinates and their hegemon (Bryła 
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spheres of influence is a highly subjective and contextual issue, 
and usually a consequence of ideological preferences.
Fortunately, it is still conceivable to create an acceptable 
definition of spheres of influence. The analysis of the category 
of spheres of influence implies they contain the following 
elements: first, they cover certain geographic units of relatively 
coherent characteristics such as regions or subregions. Second, 
the presence of great or major power is indispensable. Third, 
the spheres are grounded in some relations of subordination 
or dominant external influence that questions full territorial 
sovereignty of lesser powers. And fourth, the spheres are 
founded on the exclusion of other external powers (Jackson 
2020: 255), which means formal or informal recognition of other 
great powers of such a state. Thus, the reflection on the spheres 
of influence in the post-Cold War must consist in verifying the 
presence of the above-mentioned elements. Three former of 
these elements are observable; what is debatable, however, is 
the extent of their presence and functioning, and whether they 
are still common. Nevertheless, the main direction of criticism 
heads for the fourth element, namely “exclusivity/monopoly” of 
a given great power’s influence. If this article can demonstrate a 
lack of such exclusivity, it would also undermine the existence 
of firm spheres of influence.
The legitimacy of subordination is also important as a 
component of spheres of influence (Lake 2009: 21-22). The 
general mechanism of authority on the international arena 
basically does not differ from intrastate authority. Scholars’ 
growing attention to the issue of international authority 
resulted in fruitful intellectual contribution (Cooley 2005; 
Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hurd 1999; Kreuder-Sonnen 2019; Lake 
2007, 2017; Voelsen and Schettler 2019; Zürn, Binder and Ecker-
Ehrhardt 2012); nevertheless, it is still contested and replaced by 
a less controversial category of hegemony. A hegemon not only 
coerces subordinates but alters their agenda of policy options 
by his/her own presence and size (Destradi 2010; Ikenberry 
and Nexon 2019; Lanoszka 2013; Nexon and Neumann 2018; 
Prys 2010; Saull 2012). Some scholars add that shared beliefs 
on hegemony pose an important intervening variable (Jerdén 
2017). In general, analytical approaches differ in explanations 
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Historically, military and economic powers have played 
a decisive role in obtaining and maintaining spheres of 
influence, and the former is most important. It is inconceivable 
to expand spheres of influence without military instruments. 
The question arises: Which military indicators can serve best 
and which are irrelevant to gain knowledge on reshaping of 
the spheres of influence? As scholars noted, nuclear weapons 
themselves do not create great powerhood, because they cannot 
alter economic foundations of power (Waltz 1979, 180-181), 
threats of the use of nuclear weapons against a lesser power 
proved ineffective; therefore, they are indifferent to create 
a sphere of influence. Likewise, the size and technological 
advancement of conventional armed forces do not play a 
serious role: there existed strong but isolated states in history. 
A more relevant indicator seems to be military bases out of a 
given great power’s territory.
A military base is defined as an extraterritorial unit with an 
external actor’s sovereign or semi-sovereign rights. For the 
last decades, numerous installations called military facilities 
which serve similar functions but lack this extraordinary 
status have also been established (Harkavy 1989: 7-8). Basing 
became particularly important in the Cold War era. Bases 
served as tools of deterrence, potential offensive, and for 
the pacification of the host country’s revolution. Scholars 
observe the changing functions of basing throughout the last 
century. Before World War II external basing seldom occurred 
in sovereign states. Preponderant military powers preferred 
occupations or colonial acquisitions in which bases aimed 
to prevent rebellions. The norm undermining sovereignty 
gradually changed after the war when more mutual agreements 
indicated the status of bases. Still, most of them were related to 
occupations and post-colonial influences (Schmidt 2014, 2020). 
Post-Cold War basing results even more from contracts, not 
coercive power. Single installations like the US Guantanamo 
base, occupied despite the Cuban objections, became curious 
relics (Schmidt 2020).
Great powers’ conflicts, rivalry and cooperation have taken 
place throughout history but resulted from various modes of 
expansion and different instruments of power (Ó Tuathail 
2002: 178). Also, spheres of influence can be analysed by 
numerous dimensions and features. The spheres are controlled 
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between superordinates also vary across international systems. 
It is particularly interesting which of superordinates approve 
and which contest adversary’s monopoly within the spheres. 
Another dimension embraces causality: how major powers 
created and maintained their spheres of influence. And 
then consequently, what patterns of relations constrained 
subordinates’ freedom. Another dimension regards the 
geography of spheres, and here there appear two important 
aspects: the scale of spheres and their boundaries. Further, 
the spheres were or have existed for some time: how long 
is another telling feature that sheds light on the stability 
of international order. Finally, the spheres have undergone 
changes at the beginning, but also in further stages of their 
existence. Directions in which they have headed for seem to 
be important too. The dimensions are summarised in Table 1. 
Dimensions and 
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Dimensions and 





























Table 1 contrasts three eras: advanced colonialism of the 
industrial era approximately of the second half of the 19th 
and the beginning of the 20th centuries; the bipolar Cold War 
system; and the contemporary era after the fall of communism. 
Advanced colonial powers tended to gradually centralise their 
power and create empires. By contrast, the Cold War system saw 
informal empires rather than highly centralised ones. This was 
a process, too: the Soviet system was initially centralised, but 
after Stalin had died, even the USSR lost interest in complete 
control over its subordinates. It is uneasy to find a brief and 
accurate description of the post-Cold War period; nonetheless, a 
gradual decentralisation has been demonstrated. For instance, 
the US arms industry has dragged companies from multiple 
countries into a long-term collaboration. This, in turn, partially 
dispersed responsibilities for the production of key weapons. 
Another example regards friendly regimes of the USA, Russia 
or France that have had fewer limits in foreign policy than in 
the previous eras. A clear example is Iraq, whose Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki opened the country to Iranian influences, despite 
complete dependence on the US military support (Chulov 2010).
As mentioned earlier, the monopoly of one major power was 
seldom contested by other major powers in the previous eras. 
In the advanced colonial period, some rising powers declared 
objections, yet their primary goal was to sign new, more 
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superpowers largely applied the rule of implicit acceptance 
of spheres. The post-Cold War era seems to be more troubling 
for accurate description. Apparently, the expansion of trade 
agreements effectively undermines any major power’s 
monopoly. Yet the security domain does not exert such effects. 
Indeed, it is too early at this stage of the study to give a clear 
answer to major powers’ attitudes to adversary’s monopoly.
The next dimension regards major instruments of expansion 
and maintenance of spheres, and this does not create serious 
controversy: advanced colonialism saw conquest by military 
and diplomatic tools; the Cold War superpowers also acted 
by ideology, and military and economic support for friendly 
regimes; major powers after the fall of communism had to be 
more attractive to lesser powers, which required large-scale 
military and economic assistance, which in turn encouraged 
investment and opened markets for trade. For subordinates who 
needed security assistance, hosting powerful allies’ military 
bases has been more important than trade. And still, military 
interventions of major powers resulted in subordination such 
as Iraq in 2003 and Mali in 2012.
A more challenging issue is subordinates’ freedom of action 
in spheres of influence. A starting point can be Stephen 
Krasner’s (1999: 11-25) typology of sovereignty that points out 
four types of which three are interrelated with the spheres 
of influence: domestic which regards the organisation of the 
authority; international legal that can be called formal which 
embraces legal rights and duties in the international society; 
and “Westphalian” based on territoriality and the exclusion 
of external political superordination. Advanced colonialism 
transformed the status of subordinated units into semi- or 
non-sovereign regarding all three types. The subordinates in 
the Cold War, by contrast, preserved basic formal sovereignty 
and simultaneously had rather limited freedom of the 
domestic organisation through ideological interferences and 
external political superordination. In the Cold War, military 
bases contributed to subordinates’ constraints. As for the 
newest period, formal sovereignty gained even more interest 
and support, whereas the domestic and external political 
freedoms at first glance have been less constrained and highly 
differentiated. For instance, the establishment of foreign 
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The next two aspects regard geographic issues: the scale and 
boundaries of spheres of influence. It is observable that the 
spheres are smaller than in the two previous periods. The areas 
of special and uncontested interests of the US, France and Russia 
shrank in the 1990s. Any expansion succeeded in the protection 
of quasi-states like South Ossetia or single medium-sized states 
such as Iraq. Some great powers organised large-scale regional 
conferences that resulted in economic cooperation, such as 
China-Africa, Russia-Africa or China-Central and Eastern 
European countries. Nevertheless, these regions do not meet 
criteria of spheres of influence but are targets of great power 
rivalry for economic interests. As for boundaries, the post-
Cold War era differs from the Cold War because of promoting 
demilitarisation of borders. However, if there have existed 
spheres of influence after the fall of communism, usually 
they have overlapped with state borders. The most important 
counterexample is Syria which experienced intrastate division 
of major powers’ armed responsibility. Another counterexample 
is Ukraine. In this case, however, great powers openly disagree 
over adversary’s monopoly and compete over influences.
The next dimension is the time which shows the stability of the 
orders based on spheres of influence. In the advanced colonial 
era and in the Cold War, spheres of influence, once established, 
survived for decades. Obviously, there were single changes: for 
instance, the Soviet Union withdrew from Austria in 1955 and 
entered Cuba in 1960. But this was incomparable with the post-
Cold War era, in which the stability of spheres of influence is 
discernible only in some countries such as Belarus or Colombia. 
A superficial observation shows numerous changes: the United 
States entered some Central Asian countries and then had to 
withdraw. Many Latin American states had temporarily anti-
US governments after the Left had won elections. The cases 
of Ukraine and Georgia demonstrate the intense Russian-
Western rivalry rather than the stability of external influences. 
Also, France resigned from military support for some African 
governments against domestic threats: there was a telling case 
of Central African Republic in 2013 when France did not defy a 
victorious rebellion (Darracq 2014). In sum, the subordination 
of states in the post-Cold War period seems to be more chaotic, 
not as long-term as in the previous two eras.
The last dimension regards expansion and related directions 
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colonial era called the “scramble” for Africa. Still, the 
exhaustion of major powers’ resources in World War I limited 
expansionism and introduced the zero-sum rule: if one major 
power obtained new areas, another one lost them. However, 
the British withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1919 could be an 
interesting counterexample. In the Cold War, the zero-sum rule 
basically remained. It was the most challenging part of Table 1 
to define the pattern regarding the expansion of the spheres of 
influence after the fall of communism. As mentioned earlier, 
major powers lost decisive control over numerous countries 
because there has been much more rivalry. Admittedly, 
great powers took expansionist actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Syria, Georgia, Ukraine and many more, but on the whole, the 
existing spheres shrank in the 1990s. China, as a new potential 
candidate for a superordinate, has been gradually expanding 
its influences onto all the continents. But so far neither area 
has been subordinated by China and uncontested by other 
great powers. This embraces Central Asia, large parts of Africa 
or Latin America. Thus China is a more effective rival that aims 
at obtaining advantage rather than dominant control.
Contemporary foreign military bases as elements of major 
power rivalry
The issue of military bases receives closer attention of the 
public, particularly after incidents with local residents (Yeo 
2009). A foreign base is a hardly definable phenomenon: the 
United States itself possesses installations of various size, 
functions and status in approximately 70 countries. The US 
military has not presented any specific definition of a military 
base, because it also controls small premises such as repair 
facilities (Vine 2015: 3-4). Moreover, it is difficult to determine 
the bases of “strategic” value precisely. This can be carried 
out according to qualitative studies and scholarly intuition. 
Indeed, the first criterion should be durability—provisional 
outposts that serve for international missions do not catch the 
full attention of competing powers. Other criteria consider size, 
the number of troops, and the quality of weaponry located in 
a base: bases with combat aircraft or long-range radar stations 
are among those urging adversary’s military planners to take 
them into account.
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of the spheres of influence is Djibouti. French soldiers appeared 
first in that country in the colonial era. France quickly noticed 
its strategic location close to the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, the 
southern entrance to the Red Sea. While gradually transferring 
competencies to the local residents until 1977, the French were 
constructing a multifaceted military base for land army, navy 
and air force. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States 
looked for establishing a new base close to the Horn of Africa, 
and a former site Camp Lemonnier fulfilled the criteria. The 
USA wanted to control both the Arabian Peninsula area, notably 
Yemen, and a part of Africa such as Sudan and Somalia. The 
location gained special significance due to the rapid increase 
of piracy near the Horn of Africa and thus proved its military 
value (Melvin 2019: 1-2). In 2011, counter-piracy campaigns 
brought Japan to adjust its law and install its first overseas 
military base after World War II in Djibouti (Melvin 2019: 10). 
Also, select European powers have established small military 
outposts in Djibouti due to their campaigns against piracy. 
Nonetheless, until that moment, this multinational military 
presence could not serve as an argument that the spheres of 
influence were challenged since all these states belonged to 
alliances led by the USA. Even incidental presence of the navy 
of South Korea or Saudi Arabia in Djibouti’s civilian facilities 
does not undermine the US hegemony in the counter-piracy 
campaign (Vertin 2019: 12, 15).
A significant change started recently: since 2017, Djibouti has 
hosted China’s multitask military base for 20 million USD 
annually. The Chinese forces have participated in peacekeeping 
and anti-piracy missions for over a decade (Melvin 2019: 3-5). 
However, a final establishment of a permanent base seems 
to be a serious transformation. On the one hand, Chinese 
officials call the installation “a strategic strong point” (quoted 
in Melvin 2019: 3), but on the other, they downplay the “hard 
security” perspective by emphasising that their facility serves 
as logistical support for escort missions (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of People’s Republic of China 2016; Headley 2018). Still, 
the opening ceremony of the base in 2017 was performed with 
armoured vehicles and hundreds of soldiers (Bearak 2019), and 
analysts claim the construction contains large underground 
structures (Headley 2018). Despite common enemies: pirates 
and terrorists, China and the USA publicly accused one another 
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actions such as blinding American pilots by Chinese lasers 
(Browne 2018). This discourse demonstrates military rivalry is 
now present in one small country, which challenges the idea of 
spheres of influence comparable with the Cold War era. However, 
the exclusion of non-Chinese major powers is possible in the 
nearest future. Djibouti’s officials admitted that the size of their 
public debt towards China was over 70% of the country’s GDP, 
but they needed China’s investment to develop infrastructure. 
Thus, an essential part of the Djiboutian-Chinese agreement is 
a new railway line and facilities in the civilian seaport near 
the base (Bearak 2019). The entire investment should be worth 
$590 million (Vertin 2019: 12). Some US intellectuals started 
to consider China’s economic ties with Djibouti as a potential 
tool against the United States, and they suggest to move the 
US base to another country. Barbera port in Somaliland is 
taken into consideration. The United States has not recognized 
Somaliland, but, as suggested, de facto military cooperation 
does not require formal recognition (Rubin 2019), and the 
United Arab Emirates has already located bases in Somaliland 
without the recognition (Vertin 2019: 2-6). This thinking follows 
the patterns of exclusivity in spheres of influence, and the US 
removal would become serious evidence for that.
Another case explored in this study is Syria. For over half of the 
decade it has served as a battleground in proxy wars of regional 
and global powers. A typical civil war quickly transformed 
into a mixed conflict with various political groups’ armed 
forces supported by stronger external patrons. The illegality 
of armed support for rebel groups constrained data sharing 
by governments; therefore, scholars have to rely on media 
releases in order to analyse the Syrian conflict. As for the type 
of support, for years the dominant coverage said that patrons 
had trained and equipped their favourite armed groups. The 
only installation called a military base was the Russian naval 
facility in Tartus which had limited personnel and was seldom 
used before the Syrian War. In 2008 the facility gained a more 
substantial interest of the Russian authorities in the context of 
worsening relations with the West due to the Russo-Georgian 
War (Macleod 2008). Throughout the Syrian War Russia was 
increasing the facility’s use, although its port was unprepared 
to serve a medium-sized naval group until 2017. Then Russia 
signed a 49-year agreement with Syria, under which an 
extended terrain obtained extraterritorial status with the right 
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government. The port can now support eleven vessels at once, 
and there have been plans to construct a shipyard (Russian 
Naval Base at Tartus n/d.). In 2015 Russia officially started a full-
scale military intervention to support Bashar Assad by sending 
and using all the military branches including ground and air 
forces, many of them located in Syrian bases other than Tartus 
(Snyder 2015). It turned out Russia could not accept any result of 
the war that would weaken the most pro-Russian regime in the 
Middle East. But the United States also installed a military base 
in Syria near the border with Jordan and Iraq, which aimed at 
facilitating combat against the Islamic State in eastern Syria. 
The USA then further established several posts in north-east 
Syria to protect their pro-democratic, partially Kurdish ally 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The USA acted without any 
serious legal basis and aimed at numerous objectives including 
destroying the Islamic State, protecting borderlands around 
Iraq, and certainly also disturbing the attempt of Assad’s forces 
to retake full territorial control.
Any explanation of the events of 2015-2020 in Syria needs to 
include great power rivalry. For instance, Russian officials 
openly accused the USA of illegal military presence. There was 
also a serious battle incident between the US forces and Russian 
mercenaries called the Wagner group. The Turkish army also 
intervened in Syria in 2016 and again in 2019. However, rivalry 
cannot explain all the aspects of relations between major 
powers in Syria. Until 2011 Syria was a pro-Russian regime, 
which was reflected mainly in weaponry purchases and the 
small naval post in Tartus. At the beginning of the Civil War, 
regional actors challenged Syria’s pro-Russian status, making 
Syria a battleground. Russia’s full intervention in 2015 was 
decisive for the outcome of the war: Assad’s regime gradually 
retook territorial control, and as of 2020 nothing indicates any 
armed group could overthrow it.
Syria does not entirely fit into the category of the spheres of 
influence; nonetheless, Russia, the USA and Turkey repeatedly 
delimited provisional zones of their exclusive control. Turkey 
seized the Afrin province in 2016, and Rojava in late 2019 (Burc 
2019). The most famous example of the mutually recognised 
boundary was the so-called deconf liction line between 
Russian-backed Assad forces and US-supported anti-Assad 
coalition (Starr and Browne 2018). However, the local monopoly 
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The battle between the US army and Wagner group in 2018 
might suggest that Russia tested the US zone, although Russian 
officials denied they had known of the clashes in that area 
(Schmitt, Nechepurenko and Chivers 2018). Furthermore, the 
USA intentionally established military posts in north-east Syria 
to protect SDF, particularly against Turkey, which accused the 
Kurds of terrorist actions on Turkey’s territory. The character 
of spatial divisions of power in Syria provides the scholarly 
community with important knowledge on the ongoing great 
power rivalry. Great powers and medium powers do not hesitate 
to use armed forces against one another. The US president 
Trump’s announcement to abandon Syria in late 2019, which 
encouraged Turkey to attack the Kurds and extend its buffer 
zone, cannot be interpreted as a final withdrawal from the 
rivalry over Syria because practically the US troops remained 
and media reveal serious military incidents with the Russian 
military (Syria war: US deploys reinforcements to Syria after 
Russia clashes 2020). Exclusive zones did not disappear since 
the Turkish forces still occupy the northern part of Syria as 
of late 2020. Interestingly, the Kurds cooperated with Assad’s 
forces and Russia to avoid the Turkish occupation of the whole 
Rojava province. Assad and Russia have not permitted Turkey to 
enter these areas. Certain spatial exclusivity persisted. Still, this 
is indecisive in terms of a permanent sphere of influence due 
to dynamism of three major powers’ military presence in Syria.
In 2019 media released information on an unofficial military 
base of China in Tajikistan, which is the third interesting 
case for how military bases reflect the patterns of spheres of 
influence. Even though the Chinese government denied their 
army’s base in Tajikistan, the sources include interviews with 
local residents and the analyses of pictures. The post is large 
enough to maintain dozens, perhaps even hundreds of soldiers. 
The location of the mysterious military base is adjacent to the 
Chinese border and the Afghani border, near the Wakhan 
Corridor which is an elongated part of Afghanistan’s territory 
with a loose connection with the rest of that country’s affairs 
(Shih 2019). The sources are reliable; therefore, the Chinese post 
needs consideration framed in the problematic of the spheres 
of influence. The obvious purpose of the base seems to be the 
prevention and detection of cross-border smuggling and illegal 
movement of people, including terrorists or potential Uighur 
rebels. The geographic conditions of that area imply a much 
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border control in China because crossing the Corridor brings 
easier access to the Chinese territory. As for the great power 
rivalry, two points can be considered. First, the location in 
Tajikistan somehow undermines Russia’s sphere of influence 
in that country. Nonetheless, Tajikistan’s territory is quite 
large and elongated, Russian bases are situated in the West, 
and the location of the Chinese base near China’s border can 
be interpreted as not competitive to Russia. Second, China could 
construct the outpost in the Afghan part of the Corridor. Why 
it did not is an interesting question. Either China wanted not 
to collide its security interests with the USA in Afghanistan, 
or the Chinese government just ignored that option. However, 
the Chinese soldiers may have entered the Afghan territory 
anyway, because members of a Himalayan expedition in 
Wakhan Corridor released they had been interrogated by the 
Chinese soldiers there. The US officials also declared their 
awareness of the Chinese security operations in that location, 
which, interestingly, they had not objected to (Shih 2019). It is 
too early to form any conclusion regarding the Chinese, US and 
Russian mutual relations in the borderland of Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan. At present they do not indicate any agreement on 
adversary’s monopoly on the whole territory.
For over a decade some media have claimed both Russia and 
India had located their military bases in Tajikistan. A careful 
study brings a different picture, though. Indian companies 
had modernised airports in Ayni and Farkhor. However, in the 
former, India’s armed forces were not allowed to quarter at all, 
and in the latter, Indian aircraft were based only periodically 
(Putz 2015). The issue of the Indian air force in Tajikistan 
attracted attention, particularly in the context of “China’s 
encirclement by India” (Scott 2008: 8-9). The facts might be 
portrayed as “a circle” on a map, but the real actions of India 
in Tajikistan and other locations were quite limited. From the 
perspective of this analysis, Tajikistan seems to be a mixed 
example of the logic of spheres of influence, because, on the 
one hand, India did not locate there its substantial military for 
permanent use, but on the other hand, Russia has not revealed 
any objection to the unofficial Chinese base.
Other cases, however, do not provide solid evidence for a 
compelling argument against great power exclusivity of 
influences in one country. Kyrgyzstan has hosted substantial 
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Union. After the 9/11 attacks, the US military established a 
base in Manas which served until 2014 (Manas International 
Airport n/d.; Kyrgyz MPs vote to shut US base 2009). Soon after 
the 9/11, the United States and Russia improved their relations. 
But they worsened again very quickly when the USA started 
open preparations for invasion on Iraq. Russian diplomacy did 
not support the US military presence in Central Asia, although 
it openly started hostile actions about a decade later. In 2013 
the pro-Russian President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev 
influenced the parliament to finish its allowance for hosting 
the US military (Manas International Airport n/d.; Kyrgyz MPs 
vote to shut US base, 2009). In such circumstances a 13-year 
long US-Russian military co-existence in Kyrgyzstan reached 
its end, thus demonstrating that Russia lost monopolist control 
over security issues in Kyrgyzstan only for some time, and later 
regained it as its sphere of influence.
As mentioned earlier, in our era, states tend to limit the 
establishments of new permanent extraterritorial military 
bases. They prefer to alter the geostrategic situation by less 
eye-catching means. A great contributor to this phenomenon 
is China, for years accused of building a net of military bases 
called “String of Pearls” strategy. Careful analyses hardly 
confirm these allegations. Chinese companies constructed or 
repaired some facilities in seaports of Myanmar, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which are in use by commercial fleets 
(Marantidou 2014: 6-8). The obvious purpose is the improvement 
of conditions for commercial trade in the region of the Indian 
Ocean. China’s rivals, however, perceive this as a potential 
security challenge. The question arises: Whether and how 
China could transform these objects into permanent naval 
military bases? It is beyond discussion that China has financial 
arguments for effective persuasion, but permanent positioning 
in seaports requires official bilateral agreements that would 
be commonly commented in public. The practice of anti-piracy 
operations has proven that China can use friendly countries’ 
seaports for logistical purposes (Marantidou 2014: 12). Since the 
rational method is achieving goals at the lowest possible cost, 
in this case, permanent military presence certainly will not be 
required in the nearest future.
Vietnam is another case of multiple great powers’ military 
presence. Russia withdrew its military base in 2002. However, it 
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in Cuba and Vietnam’ 2016). Moreover, some sources indicate the 
Russian personnel, uncertain if military or civilian but linked 
with the military, have been present for recent years in the same 
location of Cam Ranh (Grossman and Huynh 2019). Vietnam 
also accepts joint naval exercises and visits of combat ships 
of the United States and India. Apparently, an Indian military 
post in southern Vietnam is under consideration (Indian Naval 
Base in Vietnam at Cam Ranh Port to Protect Hanoi’s Economic 
and Territorial Interest 2018). Vietnam’s official defence policy 
excludes defence pacts and foreign military bases (Grossman 
and Huynh 2019). Nevertheless, in front of China’s expansion 
on the South China Sea, Vietnam does not want to preserve 
neutrality. Official opening of external states’ bases would 
be indeed perceived provoking for China and the domestic 
audience. What might be expected in the nearest future is 
the unofficial opening of small posts with civilian personnel 
for the USA and India for naval logistical support, without 
any official extraterritorial bases. Hitherto nothing clearly 
undermines the idea of an exclusive sphere of any great power 
in Vietnam, but the situation is dynamic. As long as China 
avoids confrontational policy resulting in Sino-Vietnamese 
incidents on the South China Sea, Vietnam remains satisfied 
with limited military cooperation with India and the USA.
The case of Oman suggests a limited analogy to Vietnam. 
Some sources allege that India constructed its own net of 
listening posts around the Indian Ocean, and one of them 
located in Oman (Manthan 2012: 152-153). Their presence and 
status cannot be easily verified because India eschews official 
statements. If the installation in Oman really is a military 
base and not just a small intelligence post, then Oman hosts 
two great powers: India and the USA at once. In this case, the 
problem with the verification of data does not allow to draw 
a final conclusion. Besides, the case of Oman regards the USA 
and India, which before a decade abandoned bilateral rivalry 
for cooperation in selected domains.
Another aspect of (the lack of) exclusivity regards medium or 
regional powers’ rivalry. The press claimed that Israel and Iran 
at once had military bases in Eritrea (Pfeffer 2012), but it took 
place for a limited time. Later Saudi Arabia created effective 
pressure on Eritrea to join the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen 
and thus cut security ties with Iran who allegedly is Houthi’s 
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Cyprus with military forces of both Turkey and Greece. Despite 
reunification attempts, Cyprus remains divided, which follows 
the logic of spheres of influence. In most cases, however, non-
major powers have military bases along with their allied great 
powers. This regards NATO bases in Germany, French and US 
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USA
Rivalry, proxy armed 
conflict, limited skirmishes

















* Terminated certainly in 2015.
** Multiple bases, movements of troops.
*** Intelligence post, details unknown.
**** Temporary use of a modernised airport.
***** 2004-2014.
****** Navy’s permanent access to a seaport, no permanent personnel.
******* Limited personnel of unknown status.
As Table 2 summarises, there have been several locations of 
more than one major power’s military in the Horn of Africa, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Among them, 
two are examples of rivalry: Djibouti and Syria, the third: 
Kyrgyzstan in which Russia effectively won rivalry. However, the 
analysis of countries that host superordinate powers’ military 
facilities proves that there still exist numerous areas detached 
from great power rivalry. The United States commands dozens 
of military bases in NATO countries, Australia, Japan, South 
Korea and Israel, among others. Russia exclusively has military 
facilities in Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Dyner 2020). 
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although apparently not a permanent military base (Selth 2007: 
3-15). India has an exclusive military presence in Bhutan. What 
is striking, however, is a shrinking list of such countries, and 
a growing number of cases that bring more doubts about any 
military monopoly of a particular great power. Djibouti, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Ukraine to some extent—
all these countries remind us that great powers’ monopoly 
on military presence can be challenged. However, this is not 
a unidirectional clear transformation that allows researchers 
to discover a new paradigm for the problematic area of the 
spheres of influence.
Conclusions
Spheres of influence are repeatedly revolving in the public 
discourse. Yet, few authors discuss their essence and attempt 
to find a correct understanding of their reconfiguration after 
the Cold War (Ferguson and Hast: 280). The above study of 
military bases demonstrates that the rise of globalisation has 
partially transformed the security domain at the global level. 
Basically, great powers still avoid full military installations 
in countries considered either as the sphere of influence of 
another great power or simply located in their adversary’s 
close neighbourhood. There is, however, at least one convincing 
case: Djibouti that hosts substantial military installations of 
Western countries and China. The Syrian case seems to be less 
clear because military bases of rivals have served as an element 
of rivalry, conflict and cooperation at once. The security 
situation of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as explained earlier does 
not clarify if the great powers intend to altogether resign from 
recognising other great powers’ spheres of influence. Overall, 
the discussed cases cannot seriously undermine the thesis 
that spheres of influence are an element of the contemporary 
international system. However, along with Susanna Hast’s (2014: 
19-20) observations, a pejorative aspect of spheres of influence 
persisted: the idea of “encirclement” by establishing military 
bases functions as a public accusation.
What is striking is that results summarised for the post-
Cold War period are often imprecise. The study of military 
bases gives an incomplete answer to important questions. 
This implies a need for further research. Therefore, the issue 
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purchases from great powers. The economic domain can be 
investigated by analysing free trade agreements, customs 
unions and single market communities dominated by one 
major power. Another path for research is the trade share of 
each major power in a particular country or region. If one 
has most of the international trade volume, he/she is still far 
from “monopoly”, nonetheless, “a dominant power” might be 
the correct description. Finally, discursive practices regarding 
spheres of influence need to be reconsidered. This should 
encompass not only normative aspects but also highly political 
ones: discourse analysis can reveal de facto acceptance of 
spheres of influence, disagreements over subordination and 
intentional superordination.
Another interesting and promising path for further 
explanation of spheres of influence regards democracy. 
At first glance, the sovereignty of demos contradicts any 
external superordination. Thus, the post-Cold War “wave” of 
democratisation can contribute to the erosion of the spheres 
of inf luence. The methodological challenge consists in 
detaching democratisation as explanatory variable from other 
coincidental processes including globalisation or the collapse 
of formal empires such as the Soviet Union. If democracy is 
taken seriously, spheres of influence cannot survive. Then, 
endless competition is the rule of the game, not a geographic 
division of influences.
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